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In 1957, B. F. Skinner published his ac-
count of how a behavioral functional analy-
sis might be extended to the domain of ver-
bal behavior. Although the point was missed
by some critics of his Verbal Behavior, Skin-
ner did not claim to have actually performed
the kind of detailed analysis outlined. As he
stated in the opening pages: "The emphasis
is upon an orderly arrangement of well-
known facts, in accordance with a formula-
tion of behavior derived from an experimen-
tal analysis of a more rigorous sort. The
present extension to verbal behavior is thus
an exercise in interpretation rather than a
quantitative extrapolation of rigorous experi-
mental results" [p. 11].
Lenneberg's Biological Foundations of Lan-
guage is a similar document: "My theory of
language development is essentially an inter-
pretive commentary on observable facts. . . .
Most of its tenets are merely special instances
of the general premises [listed earlier] . . .
and may, therefore, be considered as fairly
common biological phenomena. . . This
book must be understood as a discussion
rather than a presentation of the biological
foundations of language. The exact founda-
tion,s are still largely unknown" [p. viii and
p. 379]. Both works, in short, constitute
plausibility arguments for particular views of
verbal behavior. They specifically address the
same phenomena when they attempt to ac-
count for an individual's ability to produce
and understand novel sentences in his native
language.
"New York: Wiley, 1967, xvix + 489 pp., $10.
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But there the similarity ends. Skinner's ap-
proach epitomizes the Empiricist Tradition
in which most American psychologists have
worked; Lenneberg's represents a Nativist
Tradition which has only recently been rein-
vigorated. We wish to emphasize that this
difference is profound and pervasive, because
it is often tempting to try to reconcile differ-
ing theoretical accounts by claiming that they
merely reflect different levels of analysis or
deal with different domains of phenomena.
In fact, it would be easy to suppose that such
is the case here.
Thus, Lenneberg is concerned with the bio-
logical bases of linguistic "competence". Un-
like Skinner, he is not concerned with the
controlling environmental variables which in-
fluence the emission probabilities of verbal
operants, but with the human organism's un-
derlying capacity for linguistic performance.
Furthermore, he does not deny that children
"learn" their native languages from their so-
cial environments in some way nor that the
empirical Law of Effect might play some role
in the maintenance, if not the acquisition, of
verbal behavior, perhaps even in ways simi-
lar to those described by Skinner in the first
two-thirds of Verbal Behavior. For his part,
Skinner has often pointed out that biological
considerations might well illuminate the
functional relations that have emerged from
his analyses, and if others so inclined can
trace the phylogenetic antecedents and physio-
logical bases of these relations, so much the
better for our understanding of human behav-
ior. Skinner correctly holds that such addi-
tional knowledge can neither disprove those
functional relations nor displace them as in-
dependent scientific contributions. Finally,
behaviorists are themselves "nativists" in pur-
suing their working assumptions that experi-
mental organisms come "pre-wired" so as to
be susceptible to operant and respondent con-
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ditioning; that human organisms, in particu-
lar, are inherently capable of learning subtle
discriminations among linguistic stimuli; and
that the human brain is sufficiently complex
and well organized to enable even young
children to generalize from learned linguistic
utterances to novel ones which are similar.
(About which, more later.) Thus, it would
seem that both Lenneberg and Skinner could
lay equal claim to our credibility with their
"plausibility arguments".
But this apparent peaceful coexistence of
the two approaches is only superficial; the
different-levels-of-analysis gambit for recon-
ciliation yields an illusory consensus that
could not be sustained as the domains of in-
quiry continue to converge, as they inevitably
will. In areas where the two analyses already
overlap (e.g., first-language acquisition and
the ability to manipulate syntactic relations),
it is abundantly clear that the plausibility of
one of them necessarily precludes the plausi-
bility of the other. The two interpretations
of "well-known facts" disagree at all levels
from the basic philosophical level about the
nature of man, through differing beliefs about
what the relevant well-known facts really are,
to the tiniest detail of why a child will say
"Johnny runned".
None of this is incidental. The decade sepa-
rating the publication of these two books
spans a period of profound revolution in
linguistic thought, a revolution fomented al-
most entirely by Noam Chomsky of MIT,
whose theory of "transformational grammar"
is still highly controversial within linguistics
itself. Chomsky's ideas were first seen by psy-
chologists in 1959, when he wrote his now-
classic, 32-page review of Skinner's Verbal Be-
havior. But many students of verbal behavior
who disagreed with Skinner's formulation
chuckled over Chomsky's elegant rhetorical
style without appreciating the fact that the
review constituted a basic attack upon the
very Empiricist Tradition in which they them-
selves were working. That fact has become
much more widely appreciated now that
more and more psychologists have partici-
pated in painful "cross-fertilization" confer-
ences with the new linguists, only to expose
their own efforts to the same kinds of criti-
cism, couched in the same flashy rhetorical
style which has apparently become a sine qua
non for admission to the ranks of the new
linguists. Years of psychological research and
arduously constructed psychological theories
in the behavioral tradition are, in the lin-
guist's view (and style), plainly irrelevant to
any nontrivial problem of language which
could be of any conceivable interest-hope-
lessly inadequate, in principle, to deal with
the most elementary facts of linguistic com-
petence, as one can clearly see if the topic is
approached in anything like a serious way-
obviously absurd if taken literally, and, if
interpreted metaphorically, serving only to
obscure important linguistic distinctions
which are apprehended by any 18-month-old
child who has had a few hours of exposure to
his native language. Even complex multistage
mediational models of language learning are
gleefully demonstrated to require the child to
learn the values of 109 parameters in a child-
hood lasting only 108 seconds.
The persuasive force of the new linguists,
however, derives not from their debating
skills, which are considerable, but from the
success of their formal analyses of linguistic
data. These analyses represent a significant
achievement which evokes admiration
whether or not one agrees with the psycho-
logical claims about language that are al-
leged to flow from them. (Chomsky provides
a brief but excellent overview of these analy-
ses in an appendix to Lenneberg's book.) Ac-
cordingly, it is not biological considerations
which are prompting an increasing number
of psychologists to accept some of the ex-
traordinary conclusions about the innate
character of linguistic competence, but the ap-
parent failure of any current notions about
learning to account for the new linguistic ob-
servations in even a remotely satisfying way.
Some well-known psychologists (e.g., Jenkins,
1968) have made public "mea culpa's" as me-
diational models of language have withered
under the attack, while others, more dis-
creetly, are privately following suit. And, even
though one of us has found Skinner's ap-
proach to verbal behavior heuristically valu-
able for illuminating certain non-linguistic
phenomena (Bem, 1965), we, too, are among
the persuaded.
Anyone unaware of this bit of contempo-
rary history is likely to miss an important
mission of Lenneberg's book: to provide a
palpable biological plausibility for conclu-
sions to which a number of uncomfortable
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Empiricists have recently committed them-
selves on the basis of formal argument alone.
This mission is not obvious from Lenneberg's
ordering or treatment of topics, from its "sur-
face structure" as the new linguists would say.
Thus, the first six chapters begin with a
quiet orderly exposition of the morphologi-
cal, physiological, neurological, and genetic
aspects of language insofar as they are known
or can be guessed at. In Chapter Seven,
"Primitive Stages in Language Develop-
ment", Lenneberg alludes briefly to the for-
mal arguments of the linguists in defining the
nature of the problem and the framework to
be employed. He then goes on to an excel-
lent review of recent work on children's lin-
guistic development, greatly enriching his
account with his own findings on speech pa-
thology in defective children. This chapter is
by far the strongest in the book and lends
persuasive empirical substance to the psycho-
logical speculations of the new linguists. In
fact, this chapter, in conjunction with Chom-
sky's appendix, comprises the best available
introduction to the "new look" in language
for anyone who has not yet encountered it;
furthermore, it can be read without reference
to other materials in the book.
In Chapter Eight, "Language and Cogni-
tion", Lenneberg attempts to argue that lin-
guistic competence is part of a more general
cognitive competence. (He here parts com-
pany with many of the new linguists.) Al-
though this chapter is suggestive, it is very
speculative and serves primarily to illustrate
the current state of ignorance by pointing up
the difficulties that appear when one seriously
approaches the topic of semantics, even at its
most concrete levels. In contrast with the rest
of the book, this chapter is relatively weak in
wedding the empirical evidence to the con-
ceptual thesis. As such, the chapter is almost
empirically empty and is therefore subject to
the same kinds of criticism from the behavior-
ists that Skinner's Verbal Behavior suffered
at the hands of Chomsky. Nevertheless, the
chapter is important because psychological
research in cognitive processes will almost
certainly be moving in this direction now that
the linguists have provided a viable example
of the approach. But, Chomsky's discussion of
Universal Semantics in his appendix reveals
that the linguists know no more than Lenne-
berg about this murky area.
In sum, Lenneberg's presentation is per-
suasive, and the weaker spots (e.g., Chapter
Eight or his account of language change) do
not impair the thrust of his major thesis. Be-
cause the actual knowledge of the biological
foundations is very meager, the method of
argument is often indirect and sometimes
even negative (e.g., there is no positive evi-
dence that reinforcement facilitates first-
language learning). But Lenneberg is very
adept at marshaling data from a wide variety
of settings, and his use of findings on lan-
guage pathology is particularly illuminating
throughout. The path of acceptance for his
Nativist thesis has also been eased somewhat
by recent findings in perception, by the in-
creased visibility of ethology, and even by the
amusing difficulties of Breland and Breland
(1961) in trying to keep operant conditioning
free from entanglement with innate behavior
patterns. "Wolf children", be it noted in pass-
ing, receive only one page, a healthy index
of an advance in sophistication if not in
knowledge.
Here then is about the best empirical foun-
dation one could hope for at the present time
for supporting the factual objections which
the new linguists have raised to Empiricist
accounts of linguistic competence: the ability
to learn language appears to be species-spe-
cific, to possess a critical period, to develop
independently of general intelligence, to have
an orderly chronological development not
easily attributable to concomitant changes in
the reinforcing environment, and to show
peculiar pathologies whose character strongly
suggests that linguistic competence resembles
other ethological phenomena more closely
than it resembles any kind of operant learn-
ing. Furthermore, natural languages resemble
one another in surprising ways that are not
easily attributable to similarities in the cul-
tural pressures operating on historically un-
related languages.
But as we suggested earlier, these purely
factual arguments do not comprise the Nativ-
ist's secret weapons. Indeed, they could tol-
erate being wrong on every one of these
counts. To plagiarize from one of the wittiest:
let us suppose, first, that the ability to
learn a language like English turns out not to
be species-specific. To make it interesting, let
us imagine that some graduate student at
Harvard develops a schedule of reinforce-
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ment that permits us to teach English to
worms. Second, we may suppose that it turns
out that there are no important linguistic uni-
versals. . . . Finally, let us suppose that ex-
plicit reinforcement turns out to play a very
much larger role in language learning than
we now have any evidence for believing. A
graduate student at Stanford discovers that
93.6% of all mothers queried ply their chil-
dren with chicken soup when and only when
they utter sentences in their native language.
The point of all this is that the failure of all
the empirical arguments thus far adduced
would, quite certainly, leave the linguist's
view of Empiricistic accounts of language as-
similation substantially unaltered" (Fodor,
1967).
The Nativists will bring out their big guns
when an Empiricist suggests that individuals
are able to produce and understand novel sen-
tences because of stimulus generalization
from grammatical sentences already learned.
Such an assertion immediately provokes ques-
tions about the nature of the dimension along
which generalization takes place. That is,
what properties do well-formed sentences pos-
sess in common that non-sentences do not?
How does a child learn that one sentence is
an exact paraphrase of another one with a
different grammatical structure, even if he
has not encountered it previously? To call the
process "stimulus generalization" is merely to
label the problem (albeit awkwardly, the lin-
guists -will claim), not to provide an answer.
It is an empty gesture until one can specify
the nature of the similarity involved and how
the child came to respond to that.
The linguists can then provide a series of
examples which easily confound any current
or foreseeable version of theories based upon
the learning of grammatical frames, mediat-
ing mechanisms (no matter how multileveled
and elaborate), or autoclitic processes (Skin-
ner, 1957). To select from their popular stock
of such examples: how does a young child
learn that "I expected the doctor to examine
John" is the same as "I expected John to be
examined by the doctor", while at the same
time learning that "I persuaded the doctor to
examine John" is not the same as "I per-
suaded John to be examined by the doctor"?
How do we learn to respond correctly to the
grammatical relations that differentiate "John
is eager to please", "John is easy to please",
"John is eager to eat", "John is easy to eat",
"John is too eager to eat", "John is too eager
to please", etc. etc. Or, finally, why would
paraphrases of the following identical frames
be so different? "They are drinking high-
balls", "They are drinking glasses", "They
are drinking companions".
So far, no learning-theoretic set of hypothe-
ses has come even close to answering ques-
tions like these. Thus, the linguists are able
to argue that the examples can be plausibly
accounted for only by supposing that they are
connected at a very deep and abstract level,
and that the human organism must neces-
sarily be "pre-wired" to deal with the trans-
formational rules that specify the necessary
interrelations. The persuasiveness of their ar-
gument lies in their concrete accomplishment,
namely, the formal apparatus that spells out
in some detail the "dimension of stimulus
generalization" in a nontrivial way, at least
in principle.
Except in their unguarded moments, the
linguists do not equate their formal model
with a psychological theory per se, but they
do maintain that any psychological model of
linguistic performance must necessarily in-
corporate their formal model of linguistic
competence, or something very much like it.
Their Nativist position will hold the fort un-
til some learning theory can either define the
syntactical relations with anything simpler
than a full transformational grammar and/or
show "how it got there". That day may
come, but it seems unlikely that the success-
ful theory will look much like a simple ex-
tension of any current Empiricistic notions of
"what is learned" and how. When linguists
assert that current behavioral theories are in-
adequate in principle, it is tempting to al-
lude to previous formal proofs that bumble-
bees could not possibly fly. The sober fact is,
however, that no bumblebee could fly if it ad-
hered to aerodynamic principles of flight that
apply to other insects but that fail him be-
cause of his species-specific construction.
That, in short, is the secret weapon of the
linguists. And that is why Empiricists are be-
coming Nativists in these latter days.
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